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Recent Development
Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean:
What Law is and Who Makes It
Kristine A. Bergman* and Joseph Weishampel**
On January 21, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Department of
Homeland Security v. MacLean.1 In a 7–2 decision written by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court held that to satisfy the Whistleblower
Protection Act (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), limitations on
whistleblower protections must be established specifically by statute,
not by administrative rules or regulations.2 The Court further held that
the Transportation Security Administration’s (“TSA”) power to
“prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information . . .
detrimental to the security of transportation” did not give those
regulations the force of law,3 and that the TSA could not prevent
disclosure of that information by promulgating regulations.4 Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, arguing that Congress
had only given the TSA a mandate to identify the information not to be
disclosed.5 Therefore, the dissent contended, the limitations on
disclosures still came from congressional statutes, and were valid rules
* Kristine Bergman is a Juris Doctor Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2015 from
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. She would like to thank Professor Barry Sullivan for
helping her understand everything about the Supreme Court; Griffen Thorne for his great EIC
work and this opportunity; and Joseph Weishampel for his hard work and patience.
** Joseph Weishampel is a Juris Doctor Candidate, expected to graduate in May 2015 from
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. During his time at Loyola, Mr. Weishampel
competed as a brief writer on Loyola’s National Moot Court team and served as an academic
tutor. He would like to thank Griffen for this opportunity, and Kristine for her expertise and
adaptability.
1. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
2. Id. at 924; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012) (stating that a whistleblower may report any
violation of any law, rule, or regulation if “such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law
and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs”). Neither party in MacLean
contended that an executive order was at issue in this case.
3. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (2012).
4. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924.
5. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 925 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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of law.6
Both the majority and the dissent in MacLean resolved the case on
the basis of statutory construction.7 Perhaps that explains why this case
defied the Court’s recent trend, which disfavors government-employee
whistleblowers. For example, in the 2006 case Garcetti v. Ceballos, the
Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a deputy district
attorney who was reassigned and transferred after he made meritorious
complaints about the validity of an affidavit.8 Government-employee
whistleblowers—such as Robert MacLean—had little recent precedent
to support their arguments.
The WPA protects a federal employee from any “personnel action”9
against him or her for the disclosure of any information that the
employee “reasonably believes evidences—(i) any violation of any law,
rule, or regulation, (ii) or . . . a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.”10 The same provision, however, also includes an
exception: an employee is not shielded from a personnel action if
disclosure of the information is “specifically prohibited by law.”11
In late 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (“ATSA”),12 which established a new federal agency—the

6. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 926.
7. Id. at 919 (majority opinion) (“The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when
it omits language included elsewhere applies with particular force here . . . .”); id. at 924
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ‘shall prescribe
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out
security . . . .’” (emphasis added) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)).
8. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425–26; see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675
(1994) (holding that when the government acts as an employer, its powers to abrogate the First
Amendment are much stronger than in other circumstances). The Court did hold, in 2014, that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contained whistleblower protections, but these applied specifically to
private-sector whistleblowers. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). Lawson did not
address public employee whistleblowers.
9. A personnel action is defined as:
[A]n appointment; a promotion; . . . [a] disciplinary or corrective action; a detail,
transfer, or reassignment; a reinstatement; a restoration; a reemployment; a
performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title; a decision concerning pay,
benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training
may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance
evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph; a decision to order
psychiatric testing or examination; the implementation or enforcement of any
nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and any other significant change in duties,
responsibilities, or working conditions.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2) (2012).
10. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
11. Id.
12. 49 U.S.C. § 114.
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TSA—to “address the security of the nation’s transportation system.”13
The ATSA allowed the TSA to promulgate regulations to define the
scope of, and restrict the release of, “sensitive security information”
(“SSI”).14
Respondent Robert MacLean worked for the Federal Air Marshals
Service,15 a subsection of the TSA that employed trained individuals to
“detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports,
passengers, and crews.”16 Air marshals like MacLean were trained on
SSI regulations, such as the prohibition against disclosing a marshal’s
flight number and flight times when on a mission.17
In 2003, MacLean and other air marshals were briefed on a potential
terrorist threat targeted at long-distance flights, both domestic and
international.18
Approximately forty-eight hours later, MacLean
received a text message from a TSA superior stating that until further
notice, federal air marshals would not be deployed on overnight
missions from Las Vegas.19 MacLean, concerned about the decision to
cancel these missions in light of the recent warning, questioned his
superior about this decision.20 His superior responded that overnight
missions had been eliminated to save money on hotels, overtime, and
travel allowances.21
MacLean, firmly believing these cancellations significantly
threatened public security, “blew the whistle.”22 He contacted a
reporter for MSNBC, who subsequently reported on and criticized the
TSA deployment procedures.23 Thus, TSA was compelled to change its
plans and not cancel all overnight missions as intended.24
13. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015) (No
13-894) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 296, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (2001)).
14. Id. at 2–3; see 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (stating in relevant part, “the Under Secretary
shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in
carrying out security under authority of the [ATSA]. . . . [I]f the Under Secretary decides that
disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.”).
15. Brief for Respondent at 9, Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015) (No
13-894).
16. Id. (citing Federal Air Marshals, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-air-marshals
(last updated Feb. 26, 2013)).
17. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6–7.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10–11.
22. Id. at 11. MacLean did attempt to report and question the decision to cancel flights to
higher authorities within the TSA and was warned not to question his superiors and to consider
his career’s future. Id. at 10–11.
23. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 8.
24. Id.
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At the time, MacLean was not identified as the whistleblower in this
matter.25 MacLean continued to work as an air marshal for the TSA
until 2005,26 when he anonymously appeared on television to criticize
the agency’s dress-code policies.27 Despite digital voice alteration,
MacLean was identified by TSA employees and was formally
investigated by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in May
2005.28 During the investigation, MacLean admitted to his involvement
with the 2003 leak. In September 2005, MacLean was fired from his
position as air marshal for disclosing SSI without authorization.29
MacLean challenged his removal to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (“MSPB”), arguing, in part, that the message received in the text
message did not qualify as SSI, and, even if it did, that his disclosure
was protected by the WPA.30 When the TSA responded to the
proceeding by issuing an ex parte order declaring the information to be
SSI, MacLean appealed the order to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; however, that court, deferring to internal regulations, sided with
the TSA.31
When MacLean’s case returned to the MSPB, the Board affirmed the
agency’s decision.32 The MSPB relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion to
reason that the text message was properly characterized as SSI.33
Further, because MacLean had disclosed information that was
specifically prohibited from release by a promulgated rule, the
disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law” and thus not subject to
WPA whistleblower protections.34
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.35 The court
reasoned that the ATSA did not specifically prohibit the disclosure of
the relevant SSI because these SSI disclosures were only prohibited by a

25. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 12.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Id. at 12–13.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id.
31. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008).
32. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. SF-0752-06-0611-I-2, 2009 WL 1759557, at
*12 (M.S.P.B. June 22, 2009).
33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10.
34. Id.
35. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions from the MSPB
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012), whereas other courts of appeal have exclusive review
of final agency orders issued within lower courts of their jurisdiction pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §
46110(c) (2012).
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TSA-promulgated regulation.36 Thus the court emphasized that
“prohibited by law” meant only law as enunciated in a statute.37 The
DHS petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the
Court granted.38
The primary issue argued to the Court was whether “law,” within the
context of the WPA, was limited to legislative law, or included law
created by an administrative agency, such as through a regulation or
promulgated rule.
Petitioner DHS argued that the SSI-disclosure prohibitions satisfied
the “prohibited by law” requirement no matter whether they appeared in
a statute or in an administrative regulation.39 The DHS relied on
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown40 for the assertion that “properly promulgated,
substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’”41
Further, because this Chrysler doctrine was so well established in
American jurisprudence, “[i]t would therefore take a clear showing of
contrary legislative intent”42 for a court to define “law” so narrowly as
to exclude administrative rules and regulations.43 Thus, as the DHS
argued, because nothing in the WPA provides a clear showing that “by
law” was intended to exclude SSI disclosure regulations,44 a court
should follow Chrysler and assume “by law” includes those
regulations.45
The DHS also pointed to the legislative history of the WPA to
support its broader interpretation of “by law.” Originally the Senate
proposed to limit the exception to disclosures to those “prohibited by
statute,” but later adopted the broader “prohibited by law” language.46
Although the DHS acknowledged that clearly Congress intended that
some agency regulations be excluded in the “by law” meaning, this did
not mean that all regulations were excluded from the “by law” scope.47
Finally, the DHS argued that a decision in MacLean’s favor would
contravene public policy, and specifically would threaten public safety.
For example, an employee who wrongfully disclosed SSI to avoid
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

MacLean, 714 F.3d at 1309.
Id.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (2014) (mem.).
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 19.
441 U.S. 281 (1979).
Id. at 295, n.18, cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 19.
Id. at 296, cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20.
Id., cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 20.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
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disciplinary action could use the WPA as a shield against employment
termination.48
Respondent MacLean’s argument focused on the fact that “by law”
cannot include an administrative “rule or regulation” in this specific
statute when the statute earlier uses the specific “law, rule, or
regulation” language within the same provision.49 Further, MacLean
relied on the purported purpose of the WPA, arguing that if an agency
could promulgate rules preventing disclosures of information supported
by reasonable cause, this would “close off the very openness the WPA
seeks to create.”50
The Court relied heavily on the text of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 to hold that
MacLean’s disclosures were protected.51 Specifically, the Court held
that the many references to “law, rule, or regulation” in § 2302
indicated that a reference only to “law” should be read to exclude “rule”
or “regulation.”52 The Court also noted that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C)
vests discretion in the TSA, which supported the Court’s
interpretation.53 Finally, the Court declared that it was unmoved by the
government’s public policy argument; even if there existed an urgent
need to prevent disclosure, that was a matter for Congress or the
President.54
As noted, the Court relied primarily on the text of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 to
determine that statutes, not rules or regulations, must set forth the
disclosures that are not protected whistleblower disclosures. It noted
that Congress used the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” on numerous
occasions throughout § 2302.55 Conversely, the text at issue in
MacLean referred only to “law.”56 The Court then cited the wellknown interpretive principle that when Congress includes certain
48. Id. at 36. Specifically, the WPA protections could “embolden federal employees to
disclose SSI and gravely endanger public safety.” Id. at 38.
49. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 19.
50. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 22.
51. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015).
52. Id.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)(C) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921.
54. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923–24.
55. Id. at 919. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E) (2012) (regarding marital status
discrimination), § 2302(b)(6) (regarding preferences or advantages), and § 2302(b)(9)(A)
(regarding the exercise of appeals) all refer to “law, rule, or regulation.”
56. See text accompanying supra note 2. In fact, in the text at issue in MacLean, Congress
used the full phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the same sentence as the shorter phrase
“otherwise prohibited by law”; it also used the broader phrase “law, rule, or regulation” nine
times in § 2302. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(2)(D)(i), 2302(b)(1)(E), 2302(b)(6), 2302(b)(8)(A),
2302(b)(8)(A)(i), 2302(b)(8)(B)(i), 2302(b)(9)(A), 2302(b)(12), 2302(b)(13), 2302(d)(5);
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919.
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language in one part of a statute, but omits it in another, it is presumed
to have acted intentionally.57 The Court held that the textual difference
between § 2302(b)(8)(A) and the rest of § 2302 indicated that Congress
intended that congressional statutes, but not rules or regulations, would
establish exceptions to general whistleblower protection.58
Next, the Court rejected the government’s argument that, because
they had the force of law, some regulations—such as those considered
here—could properly be considered law under 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8)(A).59 The Court noted that Congress’s choice of text
“provides the necessary ‘clear showing’ that ‘law’ does not include
regulations” in this case, thus overcoming the Chrysler presumption.60
For this reason, the Court concluded that the regulations promulgated by
the TSA could not be considered law for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8)(A).61
The final section of the Court’s textual analysis considered, and
rejected, the government’s claim that MacLean’s disclosures were
“specifically prohibited” by 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1).62 As the Court
pointed out, 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) does not prohibit anything; instead, it
authorizes the Under Secretary to prohibit certain disclosures at a future
time.63 The Court also rejected DHS’s argument that 49 U.S.C. §
114(r)(1) imposes a legislative mandate on the TSA to prohibit certain
disclosures,64 noting that the statute “says that the TSA shall prohibit
disclosures only ‘if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the
information would . . . be detrimental to the security of
transportation.’”65 From this text, the Court reasoned that 49 U.S.C. §
114(r)(1) did not specifically prohibit MacLean’s disclosure, and

57. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919; Dep’t of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 931 (1990);
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
58. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 920.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
61. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921.
62. Id. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, the Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations
prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security
under authority of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71)
or under chapter 449 of this title if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the
information would—(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) reveal a
trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information; or (C) be
detrimental to the security of transportation.
49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) (2012).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921.
64. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 921.
65. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 922.
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because the Under Secretary exercised discretion to make decisions not
attributable to Congress, TSA regulations did not have the status of law
for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302.66
The Court also considered public policy arguments. It noted that
reading “law” broadly to include rules and regulations could permit any
agency to issue a blanket regulation against whistleblowing, thus
defeating the purpose of whistleblower statutes.67 However, the Court
did acknowledge the potential public safety issue if all of the TSA’s
employees were permitted to voice their concerns publicly over
sensitive safety matters.68 Ultimately, the Court decided that Congress
or the President would have to act69 to prohibit disclosures such as those
Robert MacLean made.70
Thus, relying heavily on statutory text, and also considering balanceof-power issues, the Court held that the TSA’s regulations were not law
for the purpose of § 2302(b)(8)(A). Therefore, Robert MacLean’s
disclosures were protected.
In a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Sotomayor also
focused on the text of the statutes in question, but concluded that Robert
MacLean’s disclosures were “prohibited by law” within the meaning of
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).71 The dissent agreed that regulations could
not establish prohibited disclosures, and that prohibiting disclosures was
analytically distinct from exempting information from disclosure
requirements.72 However, the dissent argued that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1)
specifically prohibited the disclosure at issue in MacLean.73 That
statute provides that the TSA “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the
disclosure of information.”74 The dissent read “shall” to mean
“must,”75 which it considered a direction with limited discretion, not an
authorization.76 The dissent further asserted that the TSA’s role is

66. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923.
67. Id. at 920.
68. Id. at 923.
69. Id. at 923–24. The Court listed a number of actions that Congress could take, including
exempting sensitive information from whistleblower laws, overriding § 2302(b)(8)(A)’s
whistleblower protections, or exempting the entire TSA from § 2302(b)(8)(A)’s coverage. Id.
70. Id. at 924 (“Although Congress and the President each has the power to address the
Government’s concerns, neither has done so. It is not our role to do so for them.”).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
72. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) (2012); MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
75. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 924 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995)).
76. Id. at 924.
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limited to identifying information prohibited from disclosure; this
limited, near-ministerial role indicated to the dissent that the
prohibitions had the status of law.77 The dissent also claimed that it
would respect what it saw as the clearly expressed intent of Congress to
prohibit disclosures such as those made by MacLean and would read 49
U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) as prohibiting MacLean’s disclosures.78 Therefore,
the dissent cited statutory text and congressional intent to support its
argument that the TSA prohibitions enacted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §
114(r)(1) qualified as law under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
Because MacLean involved a whistleblower and a whistleblowing
statute, some commentators have emphasized the effect the case may
have on substantive whistleblower law. Others, however, have viewed
the case only through the lens of textual analysis. Regarding the
former, Washington Post commentator Joe Davidson asserted that a
decision for the government would mean that “Uncle Sam will have
greater power to bully whistleblowers,” and that the American people
would lose if MacLean lost.79 Conversely, at SCOTUSblog, Steve
Vladeck noted the Justices’ discomfort during oral argument with the
government’s textual arguments:
Justices Elena Kagan and [Antonin] Scalia both appeared
underwhelmed by [the government’s argument that some regulations
are “law” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)], with the latter
suggesting . . . that such a distinction was too “subtle,” and that any
argument that Congress intended such a distinction when it enacted
the whistleblower statute is “hard to believe.”80

Writing after the Court announced the decision, Vladeck cast the case
as both a statutory construction case and a national security case.81
According to Vladeck, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent drove home national
security concerns, and even Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the
issue by stating that Congress could alter the laws as necessary.82
Lower courts that have applied MacLean have generally cited it for
77. Id. at 924–25.
78. Id.
79. Joe Davidson, Federals Whistleblower Have a Lot at Stake in First Supreme Court Case
Directly Affecting Them, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2014, at A17.
80. Steve Vladek, Argument Analysis: Government’s Position in Air Marshal Whistleblower
Case too “Subtle” for Justices, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/11/argument-analysis-governments-position-in-air-marshal-whistleblower-case-too-su
btle-for-justices/.
81. Steve Vladek, Opinion Analysis: Justices Adopt Broad View of Whistleblower Protections
in Air Marshal Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20
15/01/opinion-analysis-justices-adopt-broad-view-of-whistleblower-protections-in-air-marshal-di
spute/.
82. Id.
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its rules of statutory construction. Only one case, Losada v. Department
of Defense, has cited MacLean for its substantive rule that statutes, but
not rules or regulations, can define those disclosures that lie beyond the
protection of whistleblower statutes.83 Three cases have cited MacLean
for the principle that a legislative body acts intentionally when it
includes language in one clause but omits the same language in a nearby
clause.84 It remains to be seen if MacLean’s substantive implications
for whistleblower protections will affect future cases, or if lower courts
will resolve these questions on the basis of statutory interpretation.
Some may see MacLean as heralding greater whistleblower
protections.85 While this is possible, MacLean’s reasoning was tied
specifically to the statutory text in question, making it easy to limit if
the Court so chooses. On the other hand, the Court confirmed that
governmental agencies may not insulate themselves against employee
whistleblowers such as Robert MacLean. In other whistleblowing
contexts, MacLean’s implications are unclear.

83. Losada v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 2014-3047, 2015 WL 452017, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4,
2015).
84. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 14-60295, 2015 WL 791418, at
*3 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2015); Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., No. 11-cv6201, 2015 WL 640875, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Blind v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., No. 14-cv-85, 2015 WL 349156, at *5 n.3 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2015). One other case has
cited MacLean for statutory construction purposes, specifically its reading of “shall” as
mandatory. Ruiz v. Flores, No. 1:14-cv-00179, 2015 WL 966148 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015).
85. See text accompanying supra notes 79–82.

